Introduction
releases from the Federal Open Market Committee emphasized the growth in output relative to the growth in potential, rather than the output gap itself (the level of output relative to the level of potential). 1 In remarks at the Wharton Public Policy Forum in April 22, 1999, Fed Governor Edward M. Gramlich also described monetary policy in terms of a focus on demand growth relative to growth in potential output:
"Solving a standard model of the macroeconomy, such a policy would effectively convert monetary policy into what might be called 'speed limit' form, where policy tries to ensure that aggregate demand grows at roughly the expected rate of increase of aggregate supply, which increase can be more easily predicted."
".. the monetary authority is happy with the cocktail party temperature at present but moves against anything that increases its warmth. Should demand growth threaten to outrun supply growth (the party to warm up), the seeds of 1 For example, following rate increases during the Þrst half of 2000, the FOMC stated that
The Federal Open Market Committee voted today to raise its target for the federal funds rate by 25 basis points to 5-3/4 percent. .... The [Federal Open Market] Committee remains concerned that over time, increases in demand will continue to exceed the growth in potential supply. (Feb., 2, 2000) The Federal Open Market Committee voted today to raise its target for the federal funds rate by 50 basis points to 6-1/2 percent. .... Increases in demand have remained in excess of even the rapid pace of productivity-driven gains in potential supply... (May 16, 2000) accelerating inßation may be planted and monetary policy should curb the growth in demand by raising interest rates." Growth in demand relative to growth in potential is equal to the change in the output gap, and the purpose of this paper is to examine what role changes in the output gap -a speed limit policy in Gramlich's words -should play in the design of monetary policy. Gramlich's comments suggest measurement error is one factor favoring a speed limit policy. Measurement error in the gap can be critical for policy implementation, and Orphanides (2000) has argued that this mismeasurement contributed to the excessive inßation of the 1970s. If the growth rate of potential is measured more accurately than its level, Þrst differencing the log level of the estimated gap will reduce the variance of the remaining measurement error. I ignore this attribute of a speed limit policy, however, to focus on an aspect of such policies that has not previously been identiÞed. In a standard, forward-looking New Keynesian model, Woodford (1999a) has emphasized that pure discretion, in which the central bank minimizes the social loss function but is unable to precommit, leads to inefficient stabilization in the face of cost shocks.
It is this inefficiency that is reduced if the central bank follows a speed limit policy.
The reason for this result can be traced to Woodford's demonstration that an optimal precommitment policy imparts inertia when expectations are forward looking. By imparting inertia into policy actions, the central bank's current actions directly affect the public's expectations of future inßation. A central bank concerned with social loss but operating under discretion will fail to introduce any inertia. When the central bank strives to stabilize the change in the output gap, however, the lagged output gap becomes an endogenous state variable. This introduces inertia into monetary policy, even under discretion.
This suggests that there may be an important role for the change in the output gap in policy design. At the very least, it suggests that a closer examination of the role of the output gap as a policy objective is called for. To carry out this examination, I employ a parameterized New Keynesian model and evaluate a speed limit policy against other alternative policies. I Þnd that a policy based on targeting the change in the output gap dominates inßation targeting unless inßation adjustment is predominately backward looking. A speed limit policy dominates price level targeting unless inßation is predominately forward looking. And while optimal inßation targeting involves appointing a weight-conservative central banker who values inßation stability more highly than does society, society can do even better by appointing a liberal central banker who highly values stability in output gap changes.
2 The basic model under precommitment, discretion, and speed limit policies
The basic New Keynesian model has been developed by Tack Yun (1996) , Julio Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), and Marvin Goodfriend and Robert King (1997). Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), Woodford (1999 Woodford ( , 2000 , McCallum and Nelson (1999) , Svensson and Woodford (1999) , among others, have popularized it as a useful framework for monetary policy analysis.
As discussed by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) , it is convenient to treat the output variable as the policy instrument; the aggregate demand speciÞcation can then be used to solve for the nominal interest rate that achieves the desired output value. In this case, only the inßation adjustment equation and the policy objectives are necessary for deriving optimal policies.
Most recent models of inßation adjustment have employed the Calvo speciÞcation of staggered price adjustment based on the optimizing behavior of monopolistically competitive Þrms in the presence of price stickiness, but John Roberts (1995) shows that other basic models of price adjustment lead to similar expressions for inßation (see also Carl E. Walsh 1998). With sticky prices, Þrms must base their pricing decisions on real marginal costs and their expectations of future price inßation. As a consequence, current inßation is given by
where x is the output gap, e is a cost shock, and β is the discount factor (0 < β < 1).
The second aspect of the model speciÞcation is the social loss function. As is standard in this literature, this is taken to be a function of inßation and output gap variability:
This speciÞcation reßects the widespread agreement over the objectives of monetary policy alluded to by Svensson (1999a).
Optimal precommitment and discretion
Woodford (1999a), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) McCallum and Nelson (2000) , and Richard Dennis (2002) discuss optimal precommitment and discretionary policies in this basic model. As these authors demonstrate, under both pure discretion and optimal precommitment, the central bank's Þrst order condition for the current period is given by
while, under precommitment, the Þrst order conditions for future periods take the form
The inherent time-inconsistency of the precommitment policy is revealed by the fact the Þrst order conditions for t and t + i differ for i ≥ 1. At time t, the central bank sets π t = −(λ/κ)x t and promises to set π t+1 = −(λ/κ)(x t+1 − x t ). But when period t + 1 arrives, a central bank that reoptimizes will again obtain π t+1 = −(λ/κ)x t+1 , condition (3) updated to t + 1, as its optimal setting for inßation.
An alternative deÞnition of an optimal precommitment policy requires that the central bank implement condition (4) for all periods, including the current period. Woodford (1999a) has labeled this the "timeless perspective" approach to precommitment. That is, under the optimal precommitment policy, inßation and the output gap satisfy
and equation (1) however, that the loss is higher under discretion. 4 Precommitment policies introduce an inertia into output and inßation that is absent under pure discretion, and this inertia improves the trade-off between inßation variability and output gap variability. In the face of a positive cost shock (e t > 0), a central bank acting in a discretionary environment can only offset the inßation effects of this shock by creating a negative output gap. A central bank able to precommitment, however, can also affect E t π t+1 . By keeping output below potential (a negative output gap)
for several periods into the future after a positive cost shock, the central bank is able to lower expectations of future inßation. A fall in E t π t+1 at the time of the positive inßation shock improves the trade-off between inßation and output gap stabilization faced by the central bank.
Under optimal discretion, a serially uncorrelated cost shock causes inßation to rise and the output gap to fall, but both return to baseline one period after the shock. None of the persistence generated by precommitment occurs under discretion.
A speed limit policy
Much of the recent literature on monetary policy design has assumed the central bank can commit to a policy rule, and optimal rules or rules constrained to take simple forms (such as Taylor rules) are evaluated. Less well understood is how the gains of commitment in forward looking models might be obtained even if the central bank must operate with discretion. An 3 Dennis (2002) argues that the optimal timeless precommitment policy is not unique. There is a third approach to deÞning a commitment policy in this class of models. In the model consisting of equation (1), the only state variable is the current cost-push shock realization e t . The logic employed in the Barro-Gordon literature deÞned a commitment policy as the choice of a rule expressing the policy instrument as a function of the current state. This would correspond to the choice of a rule of the form x t = be t that minimizes the loss function subject to equation (1) . Woodford (1999) shows that such a policy is suboptimal when expectations are forward-looking. 4 Dennis and Söderström (2002) use calibrated and estimated models to compare discretionary outcomes with those arising under the fully optimal precommitment policy (i.e., the policy consistent with (3) and (4) t would set κπ t + λ (x t − x t−1 ) = 0, the condition that holds along the timeless perspective optimal precommitment path. 6 This suggests a central bank concerned with stabilizing inßation and the change in the output gap would introduce inertia similar to that arising under a precommitment policy. A positive cost shock, for example, initially leads to a rise in inßation and a fall in the output gap. Under pure discretion, the gap returns to zero the next period, and the change in the output gap in the period following the shock is positive as output rebounds from the temporary contraction. A central bank that is concerned with stabilizing the change in the gap will continue to maintain a contractionary policy to dampen this increase in the gap, returning the gap to zero gradually.
The Þrst order condition under the timeless precommitment policy suggests another 5 Previously, Svensson (1999b) had shown that price level targeting had desirable properties in a model with a Lucas-type aggregate supply function. 6 Hence, a completely myopic central bank that focuses only on miminizing its single-period objective function at each point in time would deliver the optimal precommitment policy if it targets the change in the output gap rather than the gap itself. potential policy objective. If p t denotes the log price level and L the lag operator, (4) can be These arguments are heuristic only, but they do provide some insight into why a speed limit policy that focuses on the change in the gap (or a price level policy) might have some desirable properties. To formally evaluate such policies, however, we need to set up the central bank's full intertemporal decision problem when it is assigned a speed limit objective.
Suppose the central bank is assigned inßation and gap change objectives. In this case, it chooses monetary policy under discretion to minimize
subject to (1). 7 In choosing x t to affect x t − x t−1 , the central bank's policy choice will be a function of x t−1 . This introduces the lagged output gap as an endogenous state variable. Private agents will base their forecasts of future values of x t+i and π t+i on x t−1 and e t . In an optimal closedloop equilibrium, the central bank takes the process through which private agents form their expectations as given. In this case, the central bank recognizes that expectational terms such as E t π t+1 will depend on the state variables at time t and that these state variables may be affected by policy actions at time t or earlier.
Under either optimal precommitment or discretion with a speed limit objective, the equilibrium output gap will be a linear function of the lagged gap and the cost shock. Under the timeless precommitment policy, denote this solution for x t as
while under discretion with a speed limit objective, denote the solution as
Outcomes under the two alternative policy regimes can be compared by examining the equilibrium values of the coefficients appearing in these two equations. 8 It can be shown that the coefficient a c x is the solution less than one in absolute value of a quadratic equation that can be written as
In contrast, a sl x is given by the solution less than one in absolute value of a fourth order polynomial equation that can be written as
Only the Þrst factor on the left side differs in the deÞnitions of c( ) and sl( ). Both functions c( ) and sl( ) are decreasing functions of a
x . The optimal discretionary speed limit policy imparts some persistence to output, unlike pure discretion, but it imparts less persistence than under the timeless perspective precommitment policy.
While analytical solutions to (7) and (8) are not available, some further insights can be gained by inspection. For example, consider delegating monetary policy to a central bank following a speed limit policy but with a weight λ cb on the change in the output gap objective. 8 Under pure discretion,
. 9 Details are contained in an appendix available from the author. Equation (8) can then be rewritten as (7) and (9) imply that a c x = a sl x . In this case, discretion under a speed limit policy imparts exactly the same degree of inertia to the gap as optimal precommitment does.λ = λ occurs when λ cb = λ/(1 − βa sl x ) 2 > λ; optimal inertia is obtained if the central bank places more weight on its output objective than the social loss function does.
A Rogoff "liberal" is required. 10 However, the optimal precommitment policy is not replicated exactly. It can be shown that if
x , the output gap reaction to an inßation shock is given by
x |. Thus, the speed limit policy that imparts the correct amount of inertia responds too little to the cost shock. A speed limit policy that reduced the amount of inertia (lowering a sl x by appointing a somewhat less liberal central banker) would improve the response to cost shocks. 10 The term liberal is used loosely. In the standard analysis following Rogoff (1985) , a conservative central banker places less weight on output gap variability relative to inßation variability than does society. Here, the weight refers to the balance between variability in the change in the gap relative to inßation variability. In the present case, λ cb should be scaled by σ 2 ∆x /σ 2 x where ∆x t = x t − x t−1 to obtain the additional inßation variance the central bank following a speed limit policy would accept to reduce the variance of the gap by one unit. If e is serially uncorrelated, σ For the benchmark parameter values (β = 0.99, λ = 0.25, κ = 0.05), social loss is lower in a discretionary policy environment when the central bank follows a speed limit policy than when it acts to minimize social loss. While the loss is not reduced to what could be achieved under precommitment, shifting to a speed limit objective cuts the loss due to discretion by almost 30%.
Simulation results
This gain arises from the persistence introduced by the change in the gap objective. Figure 1 shows the response of inßation to a positive cost shock under the timeless precommitment policy, pure discretion, and a speed limit policy. Under pure discretion, inßation returns to zero one period after the shock. In contrast, a speed limit policy induces a deßation beginning in period 2 that persists for several periods. The speed limit policy induces less persistence than the timeless precommitment policy. Figure 2 shows the behavior of the output gap. The speed limit policy, because it is a discretionary policy regime, lead to a worse trade-off than precommitment. The output gap falls much more than under the precommitment policy and returns to zero more rapidly.
A speed limit policy generates persistence in the face of a temporary cost shock, but the output gap is much more variable than under pure discretion. This suggests that the advantages of SL over P D will fall if society places greater weight on output gap stabilization (i.e., a larger λ). This is veriÞed in Table 1 , which shows that the relative performance of pure discretion improves, for given κ (the output gap elasticity of inßation), as λ increases. Only for very small values of κ or values of λ signiÞcantly above the baseline value, however, does pure discretion dominate discretion with a speed limit objective. One interesting implication of Table 1 is that under pure discretion the loss relative to optimal precommitment varies much more as the parameter κ varies than it does under a speed limit policy. The same is true of variations in the parameter λ. The SL policy appears more robust than pure discretion with respect to uncertainty about the slope of the short-run output-inßation trade off and uncertainty about the weight to place on output objectives. For the range of values of λ and κ used to construct Table 1 , a price level regime (P L) does yield a smaller asymptotic loss than either pure discretion or a speed limit policy for small values of λ and large values of κ. However, across the entire parameter space, the SL policy is always either best or second best in a three way comparison of P D, SL, and P L. Interestingly, both the P D and the P L policies often lead to very poor results. For example, when λ = 0.1 and κ = 0.2, the P L policy achieves a loss that is approximately equal to the value obtained under precommitment, the SL policy yields a loss that is approximately 6% higher, while the loss under P D is 32% higher. When λ = 1.0 and κ = 0.01, the P D policy achieves a loss that is approximately equal to the value obtained under precommitment, the SL policy yields a loss that is 3% higher, while the loss under P L is 20% higher. Thus, the SL policy appears more robust to uncertainty about the true values of these key parameters. 12 
Targeting regimes
So far, only one aspect of policy delegation has been considered -the deÞnition of the variables in the central bank's loss function. Policy also depends on the relative weight assigned to the bank's inßation and output objectives, and this may differ from the value of λ that appears in the social loss. Alternative targeting regimes can be characterized by the objectives assigned to the central bank and the weights attached to each objective. SpeciÞcally, a targeting regime is deÞned by a) the variables in the central bank's loss function (the objectives), and b) the weights assigned to these objectives, with policy implemented under discretion to minimize the expected discounted value of the loss function. 13 An inßation targeting regime, for instance, will be deÞned by the assignment of the loss 12 The full results of these comparisons are available from the author. 13 This deÞnition of a targeting regimes is consistent with that of Svensson (1999c) , who states "By a targeting rule, I mean, at the most general level, the assignment of a particular loss function to be minimize" (p. 617). inßation targeting or to pure discretion. The intuition for this result is that nominal income growth targeting imparts an inertia to policy that is absent under pure discretion, and this inertia allows a nominal income growth targeting regime to achieve outcomes that are closer to those achieved under precommitment. This is the same rationale behind the superior performance of a speed limit policy. Regime NIT 1 parallels the deÞnitions of inßation and speed limit targeting in that inßation variability appears together with a second objective, in this case nominal income growth. Regime NIT 2 corresponds to Jensen's deÞnition of nominal income growth targeting in which nominal income growth stabilization replaces inßation stabilization in the objective function. The single period loss functions for each targeting regime are given in Table 2 . 
Speed limit targeting
Nominal income growth targeting (1) NIT1 π
Nominal income growth targeting (2) NIT2 λx
The extended model
In section 2, the basic framework could be kept quite simple since only the output gap and inßation were relevant and only cost shocks generated a policy trade off that posed interesting issues of policy design. Under nominal income growth targeting, however, shocks to potential output can affect nominal income and induce policy responses. Thus, to compare outcomes under different delegation schemes, the model needs to be enriched to incorporate other possible disturbances that may affect the economy differently under alternative policies.
The inßation adjustment equation is altered to incorporate endogenous persistence by including the lagged inßation rate in (1) and allowing the cost shock to be serially correlated.
The purely forwarding looking inßation adjustment equation given by (1) 14 When the inßation adjustment incorporates a direct effect of lagged inßation on current inßation, equation (1) is replaced with
where φ ∈ [0, 1] measures the importance of backward looking inertia in the inßation process.
The cost shock e t follows the AR(1) process e t = γ e e t + ε t (11) and 0 ≤ γ e < 1. 
where y is output, R is the nominal interest rate, and u is a stochastic disturbance. All variables are expressed as percent deviations around the steady-state. If output demand arises from 15 The speciÞcations in both Jensen and in McCallum and Nelson differ slightly from that used in equation (10). Jensen's inßation equation is (using my notation)
while McCallum and Nelson assume
Jensen's speciÞcation can be written as
where π * t = βE t π t+1 + κx t . consumption and government purchases, then u t includes g t − E t g t+1 , where g is the percent deviation of government purchases around the steady-state. The demand shock u t is assumed to be serially correlated and follows the AR(1) process
If the output gap variable x t is deÞned as y t −ȳ t whereȳ t is potential output, equation (12) can be written as
where µ t = u t −ȳ t + θȳ t−1 + (1 − θ)E tȳt+1 . Finally, potential real output is assumed to follow an AR(1) process:ȳ
( 1 5 ) The innovations η t and ξ t are assumed to be white noise, zero mean processes that are mutually uncorrelated and uncorrelated with the cost shock innovation ε t . The shock ξ t represents a disturbance to potential output. The model now consists of equations (10), (11), (13), (14) , and (15) . This makes the model almost identical to the one employed by Jensen (2001) . The central bank's policy instrument is the nominal interest rate R t .
Noting that E tȳt+1 =γȳ t , µ t can be written as
The state-space form of the entire model is then 
, and
The system can be written compactly as
where
For each of the targeting regimes, the loss function takes the form
, where the speciÞcation of the Q k matrix depends on the speciÞc targeting regime. For example, for the speed limit targeting case, 
As in the previous subsection, the optimal discretionary policy is derived for each loss function.
A gird search is conducted over values of λ k to obtain the optimal weight to assign the central bank for its loss function. The equilibrium solutions for the output gap and inßation are then used to evaluate the asymptotic social loss.
When price level targeting is considered, the model must be rewritten in terms of p t . For example, the inßation adjustment equation (10) becomes
In this case, both p t−1 and p t−2 are endogenous state variables.
The new parameters appearing in this extended model are the serially correlation coefÞcients γ u andγ, the weight on the lagged output gap in the expectational IS relationship, θ, and the variances of the innovations to demand and potential output. None of these parameters affects policy choice or social loss under the policies considered earlier. These policies, and the social loss function, involved only the output gap and inßation. The stochastic process followed by potential output did affect equilibrium output but not the output gap or inßation. This separation will no longer be true for the nominal income growth targeting regimes, so we now need to parameterize the complete model. Benchmark values for these parameters are taken from Jensen (2001) and are listed in Table 3 , together with the parameters discussed earlier. Table 4 gives the asymptotic social loss under each regime for various parameter values. For comparison, the loss under the optimal precommitment policy (denoted P C) is also shown. Column 2 of Table 4 In columns 5 and 6, serially correlation in the cost shock process is introduced. Again, the speed limit policy yields the lowest loss among the discretionary regimes, with price level 16 Loss times 100.
Evaluation
targeting second when γ e = 0.3 and NIT 2 second when γ e = 0.7.
As we saw earlier, variations in the social weight λ on output gap stabilization can affect the relative performance of pure discretion and speed limit policies. Table 5 Earlier work by Vestin (2000) found that price level targeting out performed inßation targeting, a result that holds for the parameter values used in Tables 4 and 5 . Jensen (2001) found the NIT 2 targeting regime out performs inßation targeting; this is also found in Tables   4 and 5 . Both Vestin and Jensen employ models with less endogenous inßation persistence than the baseline value of φ = 0.5 used here. When φ = γ e = 0, Vestin shows that price level targeting can replicate the timeless precommitment policy. Jensen sets φ = 0.3 and γ e = 0 for his baseline calibration. Rudebusch (2002) shows that the value of φ can be critical for the evaluation of alternative targeting regimes. To assess the relative performance of these targeting regimes for different values of φ, the optimal targeting weight is found for each regime and social loss evaluated for values of φ varying between 0 and 1. Figure 3 shows the relative performance of speed limit targeting, price level targeting, and the NIT 2 version of nominal income growth 17 Loss times 100.
targeting as a function of φ. 18 Asymptotic social loss under each targeting regime is expressed relative to the outcome under optimal inßation targeting.
When the inßation process is predominately backward-looking (φ ≤ 0.35), the price level targeting regime yields the best outcome. Optimal price level targeting does worse than optimal inßation targeting if φ is much above 0.5. Perhaps more interestingly, if the role of forward looking expectation is small (φ large), price level targeting performs much worse than the other targeting regimes. For values of φ greater than 0.35 and less than 0.7, optimal speed limit targeting does best, although the NIT 2 form of nominal income growth targeting is only slightly worse. 19 Finally, for φ ≥ 0.7, optimal inßation targeting is the best regime. This last result is not surprising; the stabilization bias of discretion arose because of the presence of forward looking expectations. As these fall in importance, the difference between discretion and precommitment also falls. While NIT 2 is never the best policy, P LT , SLT , and IT are each the best regime for about one-third of the range of values for φ. For the most empirically relevant range, the speed limit regime performs best. 20 
Conclusions
In this paper, I have assumed that the relevant monetary policy regime is one of discretion, and the problem faced in designing policy is to assign a loss function to the central bank. Virtually all the recent literature has assumed that a social loss function dependent on inßation and the output gap is the appropriate objective of policy, yet discretionary policy with such a social loss function imparts too little persistence to output and inßation. A policy aimed at stabilizing inßation and the change in the output gap (a speed limit policy) imparts inertia that can lead to improved stabilization relative to pure discretion or inßation targeting. Simulations suggested A policy that responds to the change in the output gap incorporates a form of the derivative corrective factor analyzed by A. W. Phillips (1957) . 22 In the models Phillips examined, he concluded that "it is usually necessary to include an element of derivative correction in a stabilization policy." That conclusion also seems to hold for New Keynesian models. 
